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Abstract
Over the past three decades, Ahmadiyah has been at the center of  one of  
the most significant controversies within the Indonesian Muslim community, 
particularly after the issuance of  MUI’s Fatwas in 1980 and 2005 respectively. 
This paper undertakes a discussion of  Ahmadiyah, reviewing its initial contacts 
with several Muslim organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Syarikat 
Islam, its roles in disseminating the idea of  progressive and modern Islam 
among Muslim scholars in 1940s to 1960s. The second part will review 
internal and external factors contributing to the issuance of  MUI Fatwa 
1980 in the light of  preserving orthodoxy within the Indonesian Muslim 
community. It will also highlight in brief  the government response toward the 
Ahmadiyah’s case. The last part focuses mainly on the Fatwa 2005 and its 
impact on the more strained relationships within the Muslim community in 
Indonesia. It will examine socio-political conditions before and after the Fatwa 
2005 in light of  the steady rise of  a new model of  Islamism in Indonesia and 
the conservative shift within the MUI itself, particularly after the downfall of  
the New Order’s regime in 1998.  The arguments ‘pro and contra’ Fatwa 
2005, as well as the ‘awkward position’ of  the new government on this issue, 
will be analysed in detail.  
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A. Introduction
Compared with abundant research dealing with indigenous 
Indonesian Muslim organizations, the Ahmadiyah movement1 in 
Indonesia is a subject that has been little discussed by scholars. It is ‘a 
forgotten dot’ (sebuah titik yang dilupa) in Indonesian history according 
to Margaret Blood.2  Despite the fact that the first mission of  the group 
started almost eighty years ago, its existence in the archipelago is still 
negligible. Historically, the hostile environment for the Ahmadiyah 
has stemmed from various causes.  Theologically, there are doctrinal 
differences between the Ahmadiyah and other Muslim groups concerning 
prophecy and the role of  jihad in modern times. Politically, there have 
been allegations that the group is part of  colonial aims to weaken Islam 
from within.  Socially, there is their ‘exclusive sectarian attitude’ towards 
other Indonesian Muslims regarding prayer and marriage. 
Hence, for decades, the relationship between the Ahmadiyah and 
other Indonesian Muslim organizations has been complex. Nevertheless, 
despite these conflicts, there are recorded accounts of  many cases where 
these groups have some shared points in common in disseminating 
the ideas of  Islamic modernism on Indonesian soil, particularly in the 
1 Ahmadiyah movement was founded in 1898 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
(1839-1908) in Qadian (Qadiyan) Punjab India. In 1889, Ahmad declared himself  as 
the messiah, maw’ud and mahdi for the Muslims, who received a divine revelation for 
world restoration. In 1914, upon the death of  Maulana Hakim Nuruddin, the First 
Successor (Khalifah), the Ahmadi community split into two major branches due mainly 
to internal disputes in interpreting Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s teachings and prophetic 
claims. The majority, known as Jamaat-i Ahmadiyyah or the Qadianis remained in Qadian 
while another smaller one, known as Ahmadiyyah Anjuman Ishaat-i-Islam or the Lahores 
began to consolidate the group in Lahore (now in Pakistan). In 1984, the Qadiani head-
quarter was then moved to London after facing more hostile religious accusation and 
strong political pressure (particularly after Pakistan parliament declared the Qadiani to 
be non-Muslim minority). The current figure of  the Qadiani membership in the world 
is around 10 millions, while for Lahore the membership seems still limited and small 
as this group is very ‘fluid’ and likely more simply as a new Muslim missionary society 
requiring less loyalty and strong attachment to its Lahore headquarter.
2 Blood used this allegory by quoting the title of  journalist report published 
in TEMPO magazine in 21 September 1974.  See Margaret Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in 
Indonesia: Its Early History and Contribution to Islam in the Archipelago,” (Honours 
Sub-thesis, The Australian National University [ANU], 1974). 
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formative period between the 1920s and 1940s. 
In view of  the paucity of  studies on the topic, analyzing the 
Ahmadiyah history in archipelago (both the Qadian and Lahore groups) is 
of  benefit in providing a better understanding of  the early nomenclature 
of  Indonesian Muslim organizations in forming the ideology of  
modernism particularly in the beginning of  the twentieth century.  In this 
sense, this historical study serves as background for current controversies 
involving the group, particularly after the issuance of  the fatwas from the 
Indonesian Ulama Association (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI) in 1980 
and 2005. In the last part of  this paper, the most current government 
regulation (Surat Keputusan Bersama/Joint Ministerial Decree) on 9 June 
2008 which added fuel to the already heated debates on the issue, will 
also be examined in detail.
B. History and Encounters
One of  the few works that has touched on the history of  the 
Ahmadiyah movement in Indonesia is Margaret Blood’s thesis, which 
provides a comprehensive analysis of  the group, from its arrival up to the 
1970’s.  A more recent contribution is Beck’s article published in the BKI. 
Beck aims to clarify the underlying factors that prompted the strained 
relation, in the 1930s, between the Ahmadiyah and Muhammadiyah, one 
of  the reformist Muslim movements in modern Indonesia.3  Others are 
that of  Zulkarnain’s4 and Muryadi’s.5 
While Zulkarnain analyzes the historical development and 
doctrinal differences of  the group, Muryadi’s works, written in a popular 
journalistic style, paints a general portrait of  the life of  Indonesian 
indigenous Ahmadis, particularly after the Parung’s incident in 2005. 
Some sketches of  the general history of  the group in the archipelago, 
from an Ahmadiyah perspective, are found in Ahmad’s book, published 
3 Herman L. Beck, “The Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ah-
madiyya, “Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (BKI) 161-2/3 (2005): p. 210-46
4 Iskandar Zulkarnain, Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia [Ahmadiyah Movement 
in Indonesia] (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2005).
5 Wahyu Muryadi, et.all, Ahmadiyah: Keyakinan yang Digugat [Ahmadiyah: a 
Questioned Belief] (Jakarta: Pusat Data dan Analisa TEMPO, 2005).  
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in 1964,6 as well as in a brief  leaflet published by Indonesian Ahmadiyah 
Association (Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia/JAI)7 and a recent publication 
by Suryawan in 2005.8  
In addition to this, there are some other books on the issue written 
by other fellow Indonesian Muslims. Nevertheless, all these works give 
little attention to the long history in Indonesia, and unsurprisingly its 
contents are ‘too biased,’ trying to provide a warning to the Muslim 
community in Indonesia regarding the ‘deviant’ nature of  the Ahmadiyah 
teachings.
1. The Arrival of  the Qadiani Group
Ahmadiyah missions to Africa and Asia started in the early 1920’s. 
Rahmat Ali was sent to the archipelago by Mirza Bashiruddin Ahmad, 
the Second Khalifatul Masih of  Qadian, in October 1925, in response 
to an invitation from Indonesian students who studied in Qadian. Ali 
landed in Tapaktuan, in the southern part of  Aceh, and then travelled 
to Padang in early 1926.9  Prior to his arrival, there are accounts of  three 
students, Ahmad Nuruddin, Abubakar Ayyub and Zaini Dahlan, with 
the encouragement of  Zainuddin Labai el-Yunisiah,10 traveling from 
Sumatera Thawalib school to India, in 1922, for advanced Islamic studies. 
6 Mirza Mubarak Ahmad, Ahmadiyyat in the Far East (Rabwah: Ahmadiyya 
Foreign Missions Office, 1964). 
7 Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI), “75 Tahun Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indone-
sia”, brief  historical leaflet available at http://www.ahmadiyya.or.id, accessed on 14 May 
2008. 
8 M.A. Suryawan, Bukan Sekedar Hitam Putih: Kontroversi Pemahaman Ahmadiyah 
[Not Just Black and White: Controversy on Ahmadiyah Doctrines (Jakarta: Azzahra 
Publishing, 2005), 
9 JAI, “75 Tahun Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia”; and Muryadi, Ahmadiyah: 
Keyakinan yang Digugat, p. 72.
10 El-Yunusiah also once cited in Al-Manar magazine 23 December 1923 that 
Ahmadiyah group was pintar mengembangkan Islam dan pintar menarik orang-orang Kristen ke 
dalam Islam (keen in developing Islam and in atracting Christians into the fold of  Islam). 
For that, lebih dahulu kita pujikan setinggi-tingginya karena mereka itu sangat berjasa di dalam 
Islam (we should firstly praise them highly for their contributions to Islam). See small 
leaflet “Ahmadiyah Menurut Kata Orang Dulu dan Sekarang [Ahmadiyah in the Views 
of  Past and Current Opinion],” available at http://denagis.wordpress.com/2008/04/21/
ahmadiyah-menurut-kata-orang-dulu-dan-sekarang, accessed on 15 May 2008.
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They had heard that studying Islam in India was ‘tidak kurang hebatnya’ 
(as good as) studying in the Middle East.11  
Those three Thawalib graduates, who later served as the first 
contingent of  the Qadiani missionaries activists in the archipelago, landed 
in Lahore and were initially impressed with the teachings of  the Anjuman 
Ishaat-i-Islam, or the Lahore group. However, they became bored and 
decided to leave Lahore, as they discovered that studying Islam in this 
region was ‘sama saja dengan yang sudah mereka pelajari’ (almost similar with 
their previous studied [in archipelago]). They then moved to Qadian, not 
only to find new approaches in Islamic studies, but also to learn about 
the Ahmadiyah from its ‘original source’.12 Not long after, they took the 
bai’at directly under the Second Khalifatul Masih as they possibly found 
the Qadiani teachings more attractive than that of  the Lahore. In the 
following years, due to generous financial assistance from the Qadiani 
group and affordable living cost in India, the number of  Indonesian 
students in this region steadily increased.13 In 1926, Perkumpulan 
Ahmadi Indonesia, an Indonesian Ahmadi student association in India, 
was inaugurated. 
From initial contact, the mission of  Rahmat Ali in Aceh and 
Padang was inevitably arduous and slow. They met fierce and hostile 
opposition from traditional Sumatera ulamas who, according to Hamka, 
had previously heard about this movement from their readings and, 
supposedly, also from their brief  contacts with other Muslims in 
Saudi Arabia, while doing pilgrimage. Their motives in resisting the 
Ahmadiyah varied, ranging from the religious to the political. The 
group was contemptuously referred to as loyal to Queen Victoria, or 
‘pro-hollandaise’, and seen as part of  divide et impera policies meant to 
weaken the Muslim community.14 Gradually, the forms of  rejecting the 
Ahmadis also expanded, from the simple practice of  labeling Ahmadis as 
infidels and refusing permission for burial in Muslim cemeteries, as seen 
in the order of  Sultan Deli in 1936, to more sophisticated arguments in 
11 Hamka, Ayahku (Jakarta: Umminda, 1968), p. 109 as quoted by Blood, “The 
Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 17-8.
12 JAI, “75 Tahun Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia”.
13 Muryadi, Ahmadiyah: Keyakinan yang Digugat, p. 70-1.
14 Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 21 and p. 52.
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sermons (khutbah) and publications, such as Syeikh Abdullah’s and Haji 
Abdul Karim Amrullah’s (better known as Haji Rasul) al-Qawl al-Sahih 
(the True Word) in 1927.15  This book was very polemical in nature and 
the first printed document of  its kind, consisting of  a theological rebuttal 
of  the Qadianis doctrines in the archipelago.16 
Rahmat Ali and his fellow Indonesian Ahmadis moved to Jakarta in 
1930 to find new members for the group.17 However, their arrival met with 
negative responses from the local ulamas in the region, similar to what they 
had previously experienced. Ahmad Hassan, from the Persatuan Islam 
(Persis), was one of  the ulamas in Java who initiated open debates with 
the group, from December 1933 to early 1934.18  According to accounts, 
one debate, held in Jakarta between Hassan and Abubakar Ayyub, a 
leading indigenous Qadiani missionary, was attended by more than 2000 
people from both sides. Equipped with an extensive understanding of  
Qadiani teachings and familiarity with Qadiani literature, his artful speech 
and skillful arguments were undoubtedly impressive and typically novel, 
signifying a new intellectual genre of  debate and polemic for Indonesian 
Muslims at that time. 
In doing so, Hassan mostly drew his logical and lexical argument 
from Ahmadi books without ever referring to any opinion from 
traditional mainstream Islam. However, his conclusion was unsurprisingly 
apparent at the end. After having confirmed with his counterpart that 
the arguments he was using were indeed from ‘their sources’, he began 
to compare one teaching with another to convince his audience of  the 
15 Upon this publication, Rahmat Ali published a response entitled Iqbal al-Haq 
(Accepting the Truth) which some months later was quickly responded by Haji Rasul’s 
article entitled Boeka Mata (Opening Eye). Hamka, Ayahku, p. 112 as quoted by Blood, 
“The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 23.
16 In the following decades, some assumed that when MUI issued the first fatwa 
in 1980 against Ahmadiyah, this book was accordingly used as one of  nine ‘mysterious 
references’ which until today MUI is always very ‘reluctant’ to reveal. Personal e-mail 
communication with an Indonesian Ahmadi activist in Jakarta 30 May 2008. 
17 At the same year the Qadian Headquater sent another contingent consisting 
four Qadiani activists (Muhammad Sadiq, Abdul Wahid, Malik Aziz Ahmad and Syed 
Shah Muhammad) to strengthen this mission. Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 
p. 38 
18 Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 34.
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‘inconsistencies’ and ‘lack of  credibility’ of  those teachings.19 Not only an 
agile orator and polemist, Hassan published books on Ahmadiyah as well, 
including an-Nubuwah [The Prophecy], a refutation of  the prophecy claim 
of  Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, and Nabi Yang Masih Hidup [the Prophet who 
still Alive], a response to the Ahmadiyah doctrine on the death of  Jesus.20 
Similar publications against the Qadianis, by other Muslim thinkers, began 
to appear in periodicals like Pembela Islam and other journals, which were 
widely accessible to the general public.
Rahmat Ali left Indonesia in 1950, and the Qadiani mission was 
carried on mainly by Indonesian graduates from the Perkumpulan. Three 
years after Ali’s return to India, on 13 March 1953, the Qadiani group 
obtained its legal status based on the Decree No. JA/23/1095 from 
the Ministry of  Justice which was later inserted into the State Gazette 
(Lembaran Negara) on 31 March 1953. After the enactment of  Law 
No. 8 Year 1985 on Mass Organization, the group again received legal 
recognition based on the Decree from the Ministry of  Internal Affairs.
Today’s Qadiani members are spread throughout the archipelago, 
with the main base for missionary training, upgrading and management 
(before the 2005 incident) being in Parung, in the southern part of  Jakarta. 
Its current following is estimated to be about 200.000 members, mostly 
in Jakarta, West Java and West Nusa Tenggara.
2. The Arrival of  the Lahore Group
Unlike members of  the Qadianis, Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig and 
Maulana Ahmad, from the Lahore group, travelled to Java independently 
in 1924 and received a very warm welcome from fellow Indonesian 
Muslims in Yogyakarta.21  
19 Tamar Djaja, Riwayat Hidup A. Hassan [An Autobiography of  A. Hassan] 
(Jakarta: Mutiara, 1980) as quoted by Yusuf  Badri, “Persis dan Ahmadiyah,” article 
posted on 11 March 2008 available at http://pwkpersis.wordpress.com/2008/03/20/persis-
dan-ahmadiyah, accessed on 15 May 2008.
20 Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 35.
21 There were various accounts concerning their main reason for travelling 
to the archipelago. Some said that they intended to go to Manila but lacking enough 
money, they decided to stay in Java instead. Others, like Pijper, noted that Hong Kong 
or China was the final destination where Java was only a mere transit route after their 
short visit in Singapore. See GF Pijper, “De Ahmadiyyah in Indonesia,” in van Ronkel 
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Whilst Maulana Ahmad soon returned to India for health reasons, 
Baig began his mission in Java and maintained very good contacts with 
the Muhammadiyah elites. His fluency in Arabic and English, together 
with his keen interest in mastering the  Indonesian language, as well as 
his vast knowledge in Islamic studies, made him very popular among the 
youth. Soon, he became an admired speaker, giving speeches on modern 
Islam in Muhammadiyah’s internal discussions as well as its Congress. 
Hence, Baig attracted a number of  Muhammadiyah figures who became 
loyal students, including Raden Ngabehi Djojosoegito and Muhammad 
Chusni, who at the time served as first and second general secretaries of  
the Muhammadiyah Central Board. Omar Said Cokroaminoto, the leader 
of  Sarekat Islam, was also his ‘in and out’ student and later translated 
The Holy Qoran written by Maulana Muhammad Ali (the Second Amir of  
Lahore group) into Indonesian.22  His influence over the Jong Islamieten 
Bond (Youth Muslim Association) was similarly apparent. He not only 
attended the First JIB Congress in 1925, Baig’s articles on Ahmadiyah 
teachings were also published in the Het Licht, a journal belonging to the 
JIB and well-known for its role in disseminating the ideas of  progressive 
Islam.23 In addition to this, it was Baig who initiated the sending of  some 
Muhammadiyah youths to study in Lahore,24 one of  whom was Jumhan, 
(ed.), Bingkisan Budi [Package of  Virtue] (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff ’s Uitgeversmaatschappij, 
1950), p. 151 as quoted by Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 5.  Nevertheless, 
whatever reason initiated the journey, as Beck argued, it was the strong zealous spirit 
to fight Christian missionary activities everywhere which led to the first arrival of  this 
Lahore mission on the island. Beck, “The Rupture”, p. 220-1.
22 Zulkarnain, Gerakan Ahmadiyah, p. 6; Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 
p. 43.
23 Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 41. 
24 While Blood noted three junior Muhammadiyah members (Maksum, Sabit 
and Erfan Dahlan) who travelled to Lahore for their advance studies, Beck provided 
another name (Junbad) in addition to the three mentioned names. Maksum and Junbad 
studied there for about 7 months before they decided to return back to Yoyakarta. In 
following decades, Maksum joined Persatuan Islam (Persis) and later became an activist 
in the Darul Islam movement in South Sulawesi under Kahar Muzzakar. While Junbad’s 
career afterwards was unclear, Sabit left the Lahore group and was later associated with 
the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). Only Erfan Dahlan continued his activity in the 
Lahore group however.  He served with the mission to the southern part of  Thailand 
and spent his entire life in that region. See Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 
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better known as Erfan Dahlan, the son of  the prominent Ahmad Dahlan, 
the founding father of  the Muhammadiyah.25 
The relationship between the Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyah 
Lahore in this initial period was obviously very real and intense. As Flood 
observed, some prominent Muhammadiyah elites published numerous 
articles on the Ahmadiyah movement in such journals as Bintang Timur, 
praising its role as the prototype of  a modern Islamic organization. 
Even more significant was an article published in Javabode, in 1925, which 
suggested the merger of  the two groups.26 The Almanak Muhammadiyah, 
in 1926, also included an article with clearly sympathetic attitudes and 
admiration for the movement and its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.27 
This ‘honeymoon’ lasted for about 3 years, however. Strains in 
the relationship began to show after the Muhammadiyah circle detected 
discrepancies between mainstream traditional Islamic teachings and 
the Lahore’s, in particular on the veneration and role of  Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad. Some speculated that the shift in the attitude of  Muhammadiyah 
began after a fierce speech on the deviance of  the Ahmadiyah was given 
by Indian traditional ulama, Abdul ‘Alim Siddiqi, who visited Yogyakarta 
27; Beck, “The Rupture”, p. 227-8.  
25 In this lineage context, it is worth mentioning also that Djojosoegito, Baig’s 
loyal student who later founded the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Lahore Movement in 1928, 
was the second cousin to Hasyim Ashari, the founder of  traditionalist organization 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). See Asvi Warman Adam, “Belajar dari Sejarah Ahmadiyah 
[Lesson Learnt from Ahmadiyah History],” Jawa Post 24 April 2008; and Beck, “The 
Rupture”, p. 231. 
26 See Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 28.
27 On the movement and Ghulam Mirza Ahmad, the Almanak stated that “Baru 
saja Mujadid buat abad yang ke-14 itu berdiri, maka yang pertama-tama sekali memanggil dia, 
ialah propaganda Islam adanya. Semenjak waktu itu, benar-benar ini, ia pun menjunjung tinggi 
akan bendera Islam itu. Dia punya hati ada menyala dengan pengharapan, bahwa pada suatu hari 
benderanya Islam akan berkibarkibar baik di Negeri Timur maupun di Negeri Barat (p. 141) … 
“Kalau kiranya Hazrat Mirza bukannya Mujadid bagi abad yang ke-14, siapakah lagi orang yang 
harus melakukan jabatan ini? Apakah kamu mengira bahwa janjinya Nabi yang Suci yang sung-
guh benar itu bakal tidak kepenuhan selama-lamanya? (p. 143)”. See Almanak Muhammadiyah 
(Yogyakarta: Taman Pustaka, 1926). Quotation is also found in “Ahmadiyah Menurut 
Kata Orang Dulu dan Sekarang.” 
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in October to November 1927.28  
About seven months after this meeting with Siddiqi, on 5 July 1928, 
the Central Board issued a circular to all branches prohibiting any teaching 
and publication on the Ahmadiyah in Muhammadiyah circles. The circular 
also included an order that those who believed in Mirza Ghulan Ahmad 
as the mujaddid should choose to either return to traditional Islamic belief  
or leave the Muhammadiyah. This order also applied to Djojosoegito 
and Chusni. According to records, after a heated and emotional internal 
discussion of  the Central Board, both Djojosoegito and Chusni came 
to a decision to leave. Six months later, on 10 December 1928, they 
founded the first autonomous organization of  Ahmadiyah Lahore group 
in Java, De Indonesische Ahmadijah-Beweging (Indonesian Ahmadiyah 
Movement/Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia). This new organization 
received a legal standing from the Colonial government on 4 April 1930. 
The above incident nevertheless suggested a more strict attitude 
of  Muhamadiyah towards the Ahmadiyah group, as evidenced soon 
after the 18th Muhammadiyah Congres in Solo 1929. In this Congress, 
the Majlis Tarjih anonymously issued ‘the fatwa’ (Keputusan Kongres) that 
anyone who believed in the existence of  a prophet after Muhammad was 
regarded as infidel (kafir). Although no explicit group was mentioned in 
this decree, there was no doubt that this fatwa was pointed towards the 
Ahmadiyah in general. This was the first fatwa against the Ahmadiyah 
from an indigenous Muslim organization in Indonesian.29 
Nur Ichwan found a link between the Muhammadiyah decision 
against the Ahmadiyah teaching and the Egyptian Rashid Ridha’s fatwa. 
28 According to Hamka, as noted by Blood, it was his father (Haji Rasul), not 
Siddiqi, who revealed the ‘truth’ of  Ahmadiyah teaching, along with Haji Rasul’s debate 
with Baig a year earlier. However Beck seems to believe that it was Siddiqi’s speech that 
greatly changed the Muhammadiyah elites’ perception and attitude toward the group. 
See Hamka, Ayahku, p. 120 in Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 30-31; Beck, 
“The Rupture,” p. 230-6 and p. 240.
29 And after the issuance of  this fatwa 1929, Muhammadiyah elites kept 
considerable distance in giving any comment or opinion in regard with Ahmadiyah 
in Indonesia until recently Syafi’i Maarif  (the former Chairman of  the Central Board) 
and Din Syamsuddin (the current Chairman of  this modernist organization) began to 
break ‘the decades of  silence’ on the Ahmadiyah controversies. Interestingly, both have 
very different and opposite stands in regard with this group. 
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He writes that prior to the issuance of  this fatwa, Muhammad Basyuni 
Imran from the Muhammadiyah sent a letter to Ridha asking him about 
the usage of  Muhammad Ali’s the Holy Qoran for religious instruction. In 
response, Ridha published the fatwa in Al-Manar revealing the distortion 
of  mainstream Islamic teaching in Ali’s book. Moreover, he argued that 
Muslims should not make any use of  this book or any books written by 
Ahmadiyah scholars for instruction.30 
Why were the Ahmadiyah Lahore teachings so attractive to 
Muhammadiyah circle in these early and formative periods? The answer 
seems to be that the Muhammadiyah elites had limited knowledge and 
understanding of  the entire teachings of  the Ahmadiyah. Baig never 
revealed to his Indonesian audience the controversy surrounding 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s position in the group. This first impression 
of  the Ahmadiyah movement without adequately understanding its 
main doctrines put the Muhammadiyah in “the disgrace” position. 
At a time when this reformist group was fiercely campaigning against 
religious innovations (bid’ah), with its well known TBC slogan (takhayul 
[superstition], bid’ah and churafat [mythical], it entered into a close 
relationship with a group which allegedly practiced the so-called modern 
bid’ah teaching.
Another possible factor contributing to this was the nature of  
Muhammadiyah itself, which, at the time, was emerging as a modern 
Islamic organization for the Indonesian community. In this context, 
Baig’s personality, his knowledge of  Islam, as well as his familiarity with 
English and Arabic languages, were apparently compatible with the 
Muhammadiyah vision of  what it meant to be a modern Indonesian 
Muslim. As well, in this formative period, when the movement was trying 
to define and consolidate its role as the model of  a modern organization 
for urban based Muslims in Indonesia, this Lahore group appeared to 
be a model for this vision.  
Moreover, Baig’s zeal in his speeches in combating the intrusive 
Christian missionary activities in Java was also appealing to this new 
Indonesian Muslim organization. This was to some extent compatible 
with one of  the motives for the establishment of  Muhammadiyah earlier 
30 See Much Nur Ichwan, “Differing Responses to an Ahmadi Translation and 
Exegesis: The Holy Qur’an in Egypt and Indonesia,” Archipel 62 (2001): p. 143-61. 
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in the decade. Both Baig and the Muhammadiyah elites were concerned 
with the deep penetration of  Christian missions into Muslim communities 
in Java. For this very reason, it seemed understandable if  both shared 
the same interest and spirit in providing solid and scholarly arguments 
against Christian evangelists who portrayed Islam as a backward religion 
incompatible with modernism and progress.31
In today’s Indonesia, the Indonesian Lahore group headquarter 
(Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia) is based in Yogyakarta. Its membership 
is still very limited, numbering approximately a few thousand, however. 
Unlike the Qadianis, traditional Indonesian Muslims are more likely to 
be receptive to their existence as they function simply as a new Muslim 
missionary society with less zeal to convert traditional Muslims into their 
religious fold.
3. Ahmadiyah Contributions to Indonesian Muslim Scholarship: 
A Preliminary Observation
Given the prolonged controversies with traditional Muslim ulamas 
and indigenous Islamic organizations like Persis and Muhammadiyah, an 
important question remains regarding the role and contribution of  the 
Ahmadiyah movement in Indonesia. 
In spite of  opposition to the Ahmadiyah teachings from the 
beginning, their influences in Indonesian Muslim scholarship deserve 
sincere acknowledgement. Despite the popular view, which grossly 
underestimates their role in Indonesian history, as noted by Mukti Ali 
and Deliar Noer,32  some accounts quite convincingly show that for 
decades, Ahmadiyah literature became a steady inspiration for Indonesian 
Muslim thinkers in reshaping the discussion on modern Islam. Blood 
31 See for the argument on the rise of  Muhammadiyah as a counter for Chris-
tianization on Alwi Shihab’s “The Muhammadiyah Movement and its Controversy with 
Christian Mission,” (Ph.D dissertation, Temple University, 1995).
32 Notable scholars like Mukti Ali, the former Minister of  Religious Affairs, 
has once said that Ahmadiyah was making no important contribution to the develop-
ment of  modern Indonesian Islamic thought. And the like opinion was sounded also 
by Deliar Noer. See Mukti Ali, “The Muhammadiyah Movement: A Bibliographical 
Introduction,” MA thesis at McGill University, 1957, p. 72; and Deliar Noer, The Modern-
ist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), 
p. 151.
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rightly pointed out examples of  this, mentioning Cokroaminoto’s book 
on Islam and Sosialisme, which without doubt took ideas from the works 
of  Muhammad Ali. His Tarikh Agama Islam was a ‘duplicate’ of  Ali’s 
book on Muhammad the Prophet as well.33 Other prominent scholars 
like Agus Salim and Natsir also used Ali’s The Holy Qoran as the main 
source in their books on Isra Mi’raj and the Shalat respectively. Hence, 
to quote Pringgodigdo, a notable early Indonesian historian, Salim once 
acknowledged that “amongst many Quranic tafsirs like that of  from the 
Mutazilete school and sufi order from the previous period to the modern 
one like that the Ahmadiyah, Wahabi and Theosophy groups, tafsir from 
the Ahmadiyah group is the best account fulfilling the satisfaction of  
young Indonesian intellectuals.”34 Ali’s The Holy Qoran was accordingly ‘a 
must read’ book found on the shelf  of  almost every Indonesian Muslim 
intellectual at that time.
Not only had some parts of  Ahmadiyah literature been adopted 
into the works of  prominent Indonesian Muslim thinkers, but also the 
translation of  some Ahmadiyah books into Indonesian and Dutch have 
played considerable roles in shaping the discourse. Soedewo’s works 
in Indonesian, like Asas-Asas Perbandingan Islam, and his numerous 
translations on Islamic subjects like the completed version of  Muhammad 
Ali’s The Holy Qoran and The Religion of  Islam, into Dutch, were sometimes 
the main source for middle-class Indonesians wanting to learn about 
their own religion. In this context, this literature became the effective 
medium in transmitting Islamic knowledge to those who were educated 
in Western-style institutions - either in Indonesia or the Netherlands - 
but unfortunately had limited access to, or at worst were unable to read, 
material in Arabic.  This situation was different for traditional Indonesian 
Muslims who graduated from Middle Eastern education institutions or 
were able to read Arabic. 
They were the first generation of  what we may now call ‘the new 
born Muslim’ having had a solid and convincing background in the secular 
sciences, like economics, law and engineering, but then ‘shifted’ to enrich 
33 Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 56.
34 See A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sejarah Pergerakan Rakyat Indonesia [History of  Indo-
nesian Society Movement] (Jakarta: Pustaka Rakyat, n.d.), p. 47 as quoted in “Ahmadiyah 
Menurut Kata Orang Dulu dan Sekarang.” 
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their religious knowledge and consciences through independent readings. 
Given the fact of  having gained their main education from a secular and 
modern system, these new middle class Muslims were eager to have their 
religion be compatible with modernity, science, and progress. 
For this reason, Ahmad’s claim that “the literature of  the 
Ahmadiyah movement has played a most remarkable role in creating 
confidence among Muslims in regard to the ascendancy of  Islam”35 has, 
to some extent, a logical basis.  At the very least, Ahmadiyah literature, 
written in English and Dutch, was being read by those exploring their 
new interest and desire in studying Islam. In this sense, one may argue 
that this literature played a role as ‘alternative but convincing sources’ 
for engaging in the discourse of  Islamic modernism as well as of  the 
rationality of  Islam alongside the many works written in Arabic by 
modernist Muslims like Muhammad Abduh, Rasyid Ridha and Jamaluddin 
al-Afgani. These Arabic sources have obviously influenced Indonesian 
Muslim discourse on the same issues but were only accessible through 
the traditional ulamas network. 
Correspondingly, Ahmadiyah publications also tacitly played an 
important function in shaping the arguments of  Indonesian Muslim 
thinkers responding to Christian missionary activities in the archipelago. 
Even Haji Rasul, who wrote a fierce attack on the Ahmadiyah in his book 
Qawl al-S}ah}ih, once gave humble recognition to the role of  Ahmadiyah 
in attracting non-Muslims into the fold of  Islam.36  On this point, it is 
worth mentioning that the Ahmadiyah (either the Qadian and Lahore 
groups), to use Blood’s words, were indeed ‘militantly anti Christian’37 
and obviously antagonistic toward Christian missions in the archipelago. 
The groups were keen to publish articles and books attacking many 
elements of  Christian doctrine as well as generously revealing to their 
fellow Muslims many effective methods of  ‘defeating’ Christianity on the 
35 Mubarak Ahmad, Ahmadiyyat in the Far East, p. 35 as quoted by Blood, “The 
Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 54.
36 Haji Rasul said “Di atas nama Islam dan kaum Muslimin sedunia kita memuji sungguh 
kepada pergerakannya Ghulam Ahmad tentang mereka banyak menarik kaum Nasrasi (Kristen) 
masuk agama Islam di tanah Hindustan dan lain-lain tempat,” as quoted in “Ahmadiyah 
Menurut Kata Orang Dulu dan Sekarang.” 
37 Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 54.
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mission battlefield. Some books of  this polemical kind were translated 
into Indonesian, such as Maulana Sadiq’s Jesus dalam Bijbel (Jesus in the 
Bible), Nabi Isa Anak Allah (Jesus is the Son of  God), and Kebenaran 
Nabi Muhammad Menurut Bijbel (The Truth on Muhammad in the Bible) 
in the late 1930s. 
One can justifiably say that those polemical works written by 
Ahmadi scholars greatly influenced Indonesian Muslim thinkers in the 
following decades. The use of  Ahmadi approaches and themes in refuting 
Christianity can be found in the works of  Hasbullah Bakry, the leading 
Muhammadiyah thinker, in his book Isa dalam Qur’an Muhammad dalam 
Bible (Jesus Christ in the Qur’an Muhammad in the Bible) first published 
in 1959.38  The same is true in the works of  Hadikusuma and Natsir.39 
In the mid and late 1960s, as Dawam Rahardjo noted, when Mukti 
Ali initiated a study group for young Muslim intellectuals in Yogyakarta, 
some Ahmadiyah activists like J.H. Lamardy from the Qadian group also 
joined in the discussions with other fellow Muslims to form new Islamic 
cultural movement in Indonesia.40  Importantly, as Tempo magazine has 
specially investigated, the official Quran translation by the Ministry of  
Religious Affairs in the 1970s, relied heavily on both Qadiani and Lahore 
literature. Accordingly, the second chapter of  this tafsir was the verbatim 
translation of  Mirza Bashiruddin Ahmad’s The Holy Qur’an from the 
Qadiani, while the approaches to the themes in this translation were 
38 This book was originally a rebuttal to F.L. Bakker, a prominent native-Dutch 
scholar, who wrote Lord Jesus in the Religion of  Islam, which appeared in 1957. See Hasbul-
lah Bakry,  Isa dalam Qur’an Muhammad dalam Bible [Jesus in the Qur’an and Muhammad 
in the Bible] (Solo: Siti Syamsiah, 1959) and that of  F.L. Bakker, Tuhan Yesus dalam Agama 
Islam (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1957). A detailed analysis of  this polemical work is 
found in Ismatu Ropi, “Muslim-Christian Polemics in Indonesian Islamic Literature,” 
Islam & Christian Muslim Relations 9, no. 2 (July 1998): p. 217-229.
39 See Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Di Sekitar Perjandjian Lama & Perjandjian Baroe (On 
the Old and New Testaments) (Jogjakarta: Penerbit Persatuan, n.d.). On Muhammad 
Natsir see his book Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia [Islam and Christianity in Indonesia] 
(Bandung: CV Bulan Sabit & CV Peladjar, 1969).
40 M Dawam Rahardjo, “Gerakan Ahmadiyah Dalam Krisis [Ahmadiyah Move-
ment on the Crisis],” in M.A. Suryawan, Bukan Sekedar Hitam Putih, p. vii-xxi. 
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mainly inspired by Muhammad Ali’s arguments on The Holy Qoran.41
In addition to this, it is worth mentioning that some of  the works 
published in the 1980s, in response to Darwin’s theory of  evolution, such 
as Joesoef  Sou’yb’s Adam Bukan Manusia Pertama, show the influence of  
material from the Ahmadi group.42 As well, Nurcholish Madjid, whose 
ideas on rational and modern Islam became the credo for the neo-
modernist movement beginning in the 1970s, draws on Muhammad Ali’s 
works, especially The Holy Qoran.43 
Suffice it to say that for many Indonesian scholars, the Ahmadiyah 
literature, in particular the Lahore, was very attractive, rich and 
argumentative. In this sense, having followed the logic of  these sources, 
these Muslim scholars were trying to show the compatibility of  Islam 
with modern life. This vision, in its very essence, suggested a certain 
standard of  selection for the works to be worth quoting for a larger 
audience, including Ahmadi literature. One can argue, though, that the use 
of  Ahmadi sources by Muslim intellectuals was no more than reinforcing 
their own confidence in front of  their religious and secular audiences, 
rather than propagating Ahmadi teachings or really embracing them.
41 “Jiplak-Menjiplak Tafsir Qur’an [Plagiarism in the Qur’an exegesis],” Tempo 
12 January 1974 as quoted by Blood, “The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, p. 57-58. It is 
not difficult to discover how this Ahmadi literature ‘infiltrated’ the official transla-
tion of  the Qur’an published by the Ministry of  Religious Affairs. It was the retired 
Brigadier General Bahrum Rangkuti (the former General Secretary of  the Ministry) 
who translated the works as he did the translation of  some Indian continental works 
such as that of  Iqbal’s and Nehru’s as well as some other Ahmadi books such as Mirza 
Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad’s Bentuk Dasar Ekonomi Islam into Indonesian prior in the 
1940s. Records show that he graduated from Jamiah al-Mubashirin in Rabwah, a school 
designed for Qadian missionary training. As Rahardjo stated in “Gerakan Ahmadiyah 
Dalam Krisis”, Rangkuti is indeed a Qadiani member. Therefore, with his position as 
the ‘second person’ in the Ministry at that time, the use of  some Ahmadi references in 
this official book seemed highly plausible. 
42 Joesoef  Sou’yb, Adam Bukan Manusia Pertama [Adam is not the First Human 
Being] (Jakarta: Al-Husna, 1981). 
43 See for example Madjid’s book, Islam: Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan [Islam: 
Modernity and Indonesianism] (Jakarta: Yayasan Wakaf  Paramadina, 1989). 
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C. The MUI Fatwa 1980, Government and the Rise of  Orthodoxy
On April 1974, the Rabithah A’lam al-Islami (the World Muslim 
League) issued a fatwa against the Qadiani movement.44 The three main 
doctrinal allegations were that the Qadiani group was intentionally 
damaging the very foundation of  Islamic principles with its claim of  
new prophecy, distorting the meaning of  some Qur’anic verses, and 
advocating the inapplicability of  the jihad doctrine in modern times. 
It also claimed that the origins of  Ahmadiyah lay in a British colonial 
initiative serving Imperialist’s and Zionist’s mundane interests. The 
Conference accused the Ahmadi group of  operating in Muslim countries 
with help from ‘anti Islamic forces’ in building mosques, schools and 
orphanages for the purposes of  disseminating misleading doctrines 
and an anti-Islam campaign. In addition, it also charged the Qadiani 
group of  publishing and circulating corrupted versions of  the Qur’an in 
many different languages. For these reasons, the Conference issued five 
recommendations against the Qadiani and one other recommendation 
directed to other alleged Islamic deviant sects: 
“(1) All the Muslim organization in the world must keep a vigilant eye on 
all the activities of  Qadianis in their respective countries; to confine them 
all strictly to their schools, institutions and orphanages only. Moreover 
the Muslims of  the world be aware of  the true picture of  Qadianism 
and be briefed of  their various tactics so that the Muslims of  the world 
be saved from their designs; (2) They must be declared non Muslims and 
ousted from the fold of  Islam. And be barred to enter the Holy lands; (3) 
There must be no any dealing with the Qadianis. They must be boycotted 
socially, economically and culturally. Nor any marriage with or to. Nor 
they are allowed to be buried in the Muslims graveyards. And they are 
treated like other non Muslims; (4) All the Muslim countries must impose 
restrictions on the activities of  the claimant of  the prophecy of  Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani’s followers; must declare them a non Muslim 
minority; must not entrust them with any post of  responsibility in any 
Muslim country; (5) The alterations effected by them in the Holy Quran 
must be made public and the people be briefed of  them and all these be 
prohibited for further publication; (6) all such groups as are deviators 
44 “1974 Declaration by World Muslim League (Rabithah al-’Alam al-Islami),” 
available at http://alhafeez.org/rashid/rabita.html, accessed on 18 May 2008.
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from Islam must be treated at par with the Qadianis.”45
Hence, not long after this Conference, the Rabithah intensified their 
campaign in countering the intrusive Ahmadiyah missionary activities 
in many Muslim countries and nurturing orthodoxy, calling on Muslims 
to return to the ‘pristine of  Islam’. With strong support from the Saudi 
Kingdom, the Rabithah began to give generous aid to some Muslim 
organizations, not only financing the development of  mosques and 
strengthening Islamic institutions, but also providing teaching materials 
for spreading the ideology of  salafism.  The Rabithah was also very active 
in disseminating the 1974 fatwa using government diplomatic relations 
as well as the existing ulama network. The Rabithah was in practice 
supportive of  any public campaigns, seminars and conferences against 
the Ahmadiyah and other allegedly deviant groups, including Shi’ism.46 
In many cases, it generously financed the translation and production 
of  books or manuscripts on the issue into many languages, including 
Indonesian. 
The Rabithah mainly operated in Indonesia through the 
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Mission 
Council/DDII) channeling its aid and other technical support to many 
Islamic organizations and pesantrens. The DDII, under Muhammad 
Natsir, who also served as the General Secretary of  the Rabithah, was at 
the same time and up to the present, active in disseminating ‘awareness’ 
against the Ahmadiyah movement, and Christianization as well, through 
its publishing house, Media Dakwah.  Its well known popular journal, 
Media Dakwah is undoubtedly consistent in reporting cases on both issues. 
As the Rabithah’s fatwa of  1974, had far-reaching consequences 
in predominantly Muslim countries, including Indonesia, and as a 
steady campaign against the Ahmadiyah intensified, it seemed logical 
for the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/ Indonesian Ulama Council), 
a government-initiative clerical body founded in 1975 for the Muslim 
45 “1974 Declaration by World Muslim League.”  
46 Although the sixth point in the recommendation mentioned no particular 
group, clearly it was directed at the Shi’ah group, which gained more popular support 
and sympathy from most predominantly Muslim countries. Given the fear of  the 
spreading of  this Shi’ate militant ideology, this recommendation constituted a block 
to continuing influences of  the popular image of  Shi’ism among Sunni Muslim youth.
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community, to issue a similar fatwa on the group dated on 1 June 1980.
The MUI’s fatwa was very simple and clear. Quoting its main 
role as providing religious opinion and advices to the government and 
Muslim community in general, this fatwa surprisingly made no reference 
to any Qur’anic verses or any narration taken from the prophetic 
traditions (h}adith). It stated that after discerning the report from the 
second Commission of  this National Meeting and suggestions from 
the participants as well, the meeting came to the recommendation that:
“In accordance with data found in nine books about the Ahmadi 
Qadian, the Council of  Indonesian Ulama has decided that the Qadiani 
is henceforth excommunicated from the Islamic community; it is deviant 
and misled.”47 
The issuance of  this fatwa drew considerable responses from 
Muslim organizations and intellectuals, including that of  the Qadian 
group. Some questioned whether the fatwa was ‘too general’, lacking any 
clear references to what particular teachings of  the Qadiani group was to 
be considered as deviant in relation to traditional Islamic doctrine. They 
furthermore inquired whether the fatwa was also applicable to the Lahore 
group whose teaching also centered on the veneration of  Ghulam Ahmad. 
The insertion of  the so-called nine ‘mysterious’ references was 
also a subject of  long dispute. The Qadiani activists in particular were 
very insistent that the MUI reveal the list of  nine books in the making 
of  this fatwa. The Qadiani group repeatedly invited the MUI for further 
clarification and discussion, but there was no response to these invitations. 
In regards to this controversial reference, some speculated that the 
books used were not written by Ahmadi scholars, but were traditional 
Muslim Arabic literature, which unsurprisingly depicted the deviant side 
of  Ahmadiyah. This speculation seemed plausible given the fact that the 
Rabithah was at that time very generous in supplying books and other 
documents on the issue. Others argued that the nine references were 
mainly written by previous Indonesian scholars in forms of  books, like 
that of  Haji Rasul’s al-Qawl al-S}ah}ih and Ahmad Hassan’s an-Nubuwah, 
47 See “Keputusan Musyawarah Nasional II Majelis Ulama se-Indonesian No. 
05/Kep/Munas II/MUI/1980 Fatwa Tentang Ahmadiyah.” Available also http://www.
khilafah1924.org/index2. php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=468, accessed on 14 May 
2008. 
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and articles.48 
The fatwa itself  was poorly implemented as it received ‘inadequate’ 
support from the New Order regime. Support from the government was 
essential due to the statement in the fatwa that “regarding the Ahmadiyah 
case, Indonesian Ulama Council is expected to be in constant contact with 
the government (Dalam menghadapi persoalan Ahmadiyah, hendaknya Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia selalu berhubungan dengan pemerintah).” In this context, 
as the issuance of  this fatwa was acknowledged by the Minister of  
Religious Affairs (who was the retired General Alamsjah Prawiranegara), 
the implementation of  the fatwa was obviously dependent on the 
government’s support. However, surprisingly the government did nothing 
significant with regards to implementing the fatwa.
Discerning that the government was very reluctant to take further 
steps with the case, some ulamas accordingly sent a petition to the 
Rabithah to put more ‘pressure’ on the regime. A year later, in 1981, the 
Saudi Kingdom sent a formal letter to the Ministry of  Religious Affairs 
requesting the issuance of  a legal prohibition of  the Ahmadiyah operating 
in the archipelago.  With ‘diplomatic pressure’ from the Saudi Kingdom 
and the expectation of  government support for the 1980 fatwa on the 
one hand, as well as the appearance of  many publications against the 
Ahmadiyah by Muslim orthodox groups, such as from Media Dakwah 
and other publishing houses like Bulan Bintang and Alma’arif,49 the regime 
48 Personal e-mail communication with an Indonesian Ahmadi activist in Jakarta 
30 May 2008. 
49 See for examples Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), Tidak Ada 
Nabi Sesudah Muhammad SAW: Laporan Debate Pembela Islam dengan Ahmadiyah Qadian 
[There is no Prophet after Muhammad: Report on Debate between Pembela Islam and 
the Ahmadiyah Qadianis] (Jakarta: Media dakwah, 1979) and Laporan Dokumen-dokumen 
Resmi dan Keputusan Konperensi Islam Internasional tentang Ahmadiyah [Report on Official 
Documents and Resolutions of  International Islamic Conference on the Ahmadiyah] 
(Jakarta: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, 1981);  and books like Abu al-Husayn 
‘Ali al-Husni al-Nadwi, Ahmadiyah (Yogyakarta: Horison Press, n.d.); Abdullah Hasan 
Alhadar, Ahmadiyah Telanjang Bulat di Panggung Sejarah [Ahmadiyah Naked in front 
of  History] (Bandung: Alma’arif, 1980); Hamka Haq Al-Badry, Koreksi Total terhadap 
Ahmadiyah [Total Correction on the Ahmadiyah] (Jakarta: Yayasan Nurul Islam, 1981); 
Fawzy Saied Thaha, Ahmadiyah dalam Persoalan [The Ahmadiyah in Question] (Bandung: 
Alma’arif, 1981); and  Ahmad Hariadi, Mengapa Saya Keluar dari Ahmadiyah Qadiani [Why 
I left the Qadiani Group] (Bandung: Yayasan Kebangkitan Kaum Muslimin, 1984). 
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finally took a clearer position on the controversy. About four years after 
the MUI fatwa, on 20 September 1984, the Ministry of  Religious Affairs 
(MORA), through the Directorate General for Islamic Guidance and the 
Hajj (Dirjen Bimas Islam dan Urusan Haji) issued a circular to all MORA 
offices in province and district levels stating that: 
“[A]fter a close examination to the Ahmadiyah, it comes to a conclusion 
that the Ahmadiyah Qadiani is regarded as deviant from the mainstreaming 
Islam as having the belief  that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a prophet, so 
then the Prophet Muhammad is not for them the last prophet.”50  
It also further stated that: 
“[I]t should be kept a vigilant eye that the activities of  Indonesian 
Ahmadiyah Community are only directed into their own fold in order 
to avoid the unrest within the society or to disharmonize religious life.”51
Following the issuance of  this circular, some district Attorney’s 
offices (Kejaksaan Negeri or the Kejari) were more responsive in overseeing 
the activities of  the Ahmadiyah group in their particular regions. The 
Kejaris of  Sidenreng South Sulawesi in 1986), of  Kerinci Jambi in 1989, 
of  Tarakan East Kalimantan in 1989 and of  Meulaboh in West Aceh in 
1990, respectively issued decrees prohibiting the activities of  the group 
after some incidents involving the Ahmadi members occurred in those 
regions. 
At first glance, it appears that issuance of  this ministerial-level 
circular and regional decrees provide the basis for the banishment of  the 
Ahmadiyah movement from Indonesia. However, closer examination 
reveals that the circular and those decrees lacked ‘credibility’. Having 
discerned that the ministerial policy on this controversy was in a lower 
level form and signed at the second level in the bureaucratic hierarchy 
(i.e. Dirjen Bimas dan Haji) and not by the Minister himself, one could 
argue that this circular was obviously insufficient to serve as the basis 
for any sanctioned action toward the group. The nature of  a circular in 
50 “Surat Edaran Dirjen Bimas Islam dan Urusan Haji No. D/BA/01/3099/1984 
tentang Ahmadiyah.”  See also Departemen Agama’s publication a year after this circular 
in Faham Ahmadiyah: Hasil Telaah Kasus [Ahmadiyah Belief: The Case Study] (Jakarta: 
Puslitbang Kehidupan Beragama Departemen Agama RI, 1985)
51 See “Surat Edaran Dirjen Bimas Islam dan Urusan Haji.” 
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the Indonesian legal system, or in general within particular Ministries, 
was for internal administrative portfolio, and more importantly was not 
legally binding on any external party.  The use of  the circular-form, and it 
being signed by a lower level of  bureaucrat, signified that the government 
intended to keep the dispute over Ahmadiyah as being merely an internal 
Muslim affair rather an acute national problem, which required the 
involvement of  a more authoritative governing body. 
The decrees from some Kejaris had had limitations in practice 
however. Given the centralized tendency of  the New Order regime, 
these were only applicable and operative in the local region (kabupaten) 
but had no legal implications at the provincial and national levels. In this 
context, an important reason for the regulations was to respond to the 
demands of  Muslim groups in these particular regions and to address 
regional unrest and instability.  
Hence, the policy, whether in the form of  the circular or regional 
decrees, was not intentionally designed to ‘solve’ or ‘end’ the controversy 
at the national level. Rather, it was only an artificial solution but essential 
for the sake of  improving the reputation of  the regime, which was focused 
on political survival, and maintaining stability. These were important 
considerations for the regime during the period of  the 1980’s as it began 
to institute Pancasila as the azas tunggal (sole ideological basis) for all 
Indonesian organizations, and later in the early 1990’s, when it forced 
all organizations to implement this azas tunggal policy. For this reason, 
one could say that the contest for hegemonic intervention over this law 
making tacitly served the interests of  the regime itself. In this sense, 
through this policy, not only had the government given an adequate 
and elegant response to the inquiry of  the Saudi Kingdom (and the 
Rabithah), but at the same time it successfully gained support from the 
Muslim majority group who believed that the regime had answered their 
demands to block Ahmadiyah teaching and activity. 
D. The MUI Fatwa 2005, Government and the New Model of  
Islamism
On 29 July 2005, the MUI issued a second fatwa on the Ahmadiyah, 
signed by K.H. Ma’ruf  Amin, the chairperson for the Fatwa Commission. 
The document of  this new fatwa contained many references, not only 
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from the Qur’an and the h}adith narrations but also from previous 
recommendations from other institutions, including the Majma al-Fiqh 
al-Islami (Islamic Jurisprudence Council) of  the Munadhamah al-
Mu’tamar al-Islami (Organization of  the Islamic Conference or the OIC) 
on December 1985, the Majma al-Fiqh al-Islamic of  the Rabithah A’lam 
al-Islami (the World Muslim League), and the Majma al-Buhuts (Expert 
Research Council), as well as the previous MUI fatwa 1980. There were 
three main recommendations in this new fatwa:
“[First] Reinstate its previous fatwa of  the 2nd National Meeting 1980 
which declared that Ahmadiyah is out of  the fold of  Islam; deviant and 
misled, and therefore Muslims who followed it are heretic; [second] 
Those who have been following the Ahmadiyah sect are called to return 
to the righteous Islamic teaching in accord with the Qur’an and the h}adith; 
[third] The government has a duty to prohibit the spread of  Ahmadiyah 
belief  throughout Indonesia, to ban the organization and to close all 
centers for the activities.”52
There is no doubt that the issuance of  some current fatwas (and 
tausiyahs) on various issues signified a paradigm shift of  the MUI from 
more or less serving the interests of  the ruling regime in managing 
Islamic affairs, to occupying a more determined position in bargaining 
and negotiating with other parties.53 It makes sense that after decades of  
serving under a powerful authoritarian regime, the Muslim community, as 
the dominant group, would try to assert itself  in the process of  decision 
making, and in some cases, to serve as a quasi-governing institution in 
protecting and preserving their interests and values. And in this context, 
the MUI repeatedly claimed its role as the ‘sole’ representative for all 
Muslim organizations in Indonesia or in the service of  defending the 
interests of  the Indonesian majority Muslim group. 
However, the claim that MUI’s service was for the sake of  the 
majority is questionable particularly in light of  the new composition 
52 See “Keputusan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia No. 11/MUNAS 
VII/15/2005 tentang Aliran Ahmadiyah,” available at http://www.mui.id/mui_in/fatwa.
php?id=131, accessed on 26 May 2008.
53 Current studies on the MUI see Nadirsyah Hosen, “Behind the Scenes: Fatwas 
of  Majelis Ulama Indonesia (1975–1998),” Journal of  Islamic Studies 15:2 (2004) p. 
147–179; and Moch. Nur Ichwan, “Ulama, State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
after Suharto,” Islamic Law and Society 12, 1 (2005); p. 45-72
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of  MUI. It is a fact that soon after the fall of  the New Order’s regime, 
numerous new Islamic organizations were established in Indonesia and 
demanded representation in MUI. Some of  these were very small and 
very conservative in nature, advocating for the manifestation of  ‘Islamic’ 
symbols and the explicit application of  Islamic law in the public sphere. 
Hence, as the MUI’s membership now consisted of  representation 
from Muslim organizations, rather than individual independent 
Muslim scholar, all members in this organization were treated as equal 
in any decision making. Regardless of  size or influence, represented 
organizations each have one vote in the voting process.  With this 
inappropriate proportion in membership composition, when it comes to 
voting on social and religious issues, MUI itself  unsurprisingly represents 
more ‘conservative’ and ‘ultraorthodox’ tendencies accumulated from 
the smaller groups, rather than the views of  the moderate majorities.
In this vein, having seen the conservative outlook of  these small 
groups which greatly influence and steer the direction of  the MUI, one 
can easily argue that this organization maintains a determinant position 
in establishing the hegemonic model of  what constitutes ‘acceptable’ and 
‘correct’, according to ‘Islamic’, or more precisely, the salafi, doctrines. The 
issuance of  Fatwa no. 7, opposing pluralism, liberalism and secularism, 
and Fatwa no. 11, on the Ahmadiyah case in 2005, as well as its apparent 
support of  the controversial draft of  the new law on anti-pornography 
in 2006, are examples of  the persistent character of  the current MUI.
The MUI issued its fatwa against the Ahmadiyah only a couple 
weeks after the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Qadiani headquarter in southern 
part of  Jakarta (Parung West Java) had been attacked in early July 2005.54 
In this Parung incident, the ‘Muslim’ mobs injured some Ahmadiyah 
members, who were at the time participating in the Ahmadiyah Annual 
Meeting (Jalsah Salanah), and destroyed property in the compound. Some 
activists and human rights observers saw a link between this incident 
and the wave of  systematic attacks and destruction of  Ahmadiyah 
property in 2005 and 2006.55  In turn, the same violent pattern repeated 
54 See more in Muryadi, Ahmadiyah: Keyakinan yang Digugat, p. 1-33.
55 Some attacks and destruction of  Ahmadiyah property occurred in Cianjur 
West Java in 6 August 2005, in Majalengka West Java in 19 August 2005, in four loca-
tions of  South Cianjur (West Java) in 19 October 2005 and 4 February 2006 in West 
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itself  with other groups accused of  being deviants or heretics, such as 
the communities of  Yusman Roy, the members of  Yayasan Kanker dan 
Narkoba Cahaya Alam (YKNCA), Lia Aminuddin’s Kerajaan Eden and 
recently of  al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah. Others went further, linking these 
attacks with numerous attempts, over the same time period, to close 
down supposedly illegal churches in many regions, such as in Jakarta, 
Banyuwangi East Java and Bandung West Java. 
There was speculation as to why these violent attacks were 
becoming the new pattern for ‘problem solving’ in Indonesia. Many 
blamed the inability of  the new government to provide basic living needs 
and security as the main reason, and therefore the attacks on ‘heretic’ 
sects was a channel for expressing their accumulated social prejudice and 
frustration. Others saw a wider systematic campaign against heresy that 
represented a creeping ‘shariatization’ of  Indonesia, with these ‘deviant’ 
sects as ‘soft targets’ before further negotiations to ‘islamize’ all aspects 
of  Indonesian social and political life.
Whatever reasons motivated these attacks on the rights and 
property of  groups in Indonesia, for many religious and human rights 
activists, it was the opinions of  religious leaders which undoubtedly 
justified the violence, apparently referring to the MUI’s fatwa. In the case 
of  the Ahmadiyah, some have shown that attacks in many regions began 
with heated sermons on the dangerous nature of  the Ahmadiyah for 
the Muslim community. The sermons unsurprisingly quoted the fatwa of  
the MUI as religious evidence against the group, arguing that, as zealous 
Muslims, they have a moral responsibility to ‘follow up’ in the form of  
‘physical action’.56 
In line with this, some saw that, in the wider context of  the central 
and regional levels, the MUI fatwas triggered vigilantism in regions where 
Lombok West Nusa Tenggara, in October 2005 September 2005, and in Leuwisadeng 
Bogor West Java in 6 January 2006. Numerous demonstrations against the Ahmadiyah 
group and the closing and burning of  some Ahmadiyah mosques occurred between 
2005 and 2007.
56 Akh. Muzakki, “Fatwa dan Kekerasan [Fatwa and Violence]” Koran Tempo 
28 December 2007; and Maksun, “MUI, Ahmadiyah dan Fikih Toleransi,” Harian Su-
ara Merdeka 16 April 2008; Imam Ghazali Said, “Membela Ahmadiyah yang Dizalimi 
[Defending the Accused Ahmadiyah],” Jawa Pos 28 April 2008.
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law enforcement agencies were unable to maintain order.57  It is also 
evident that the fatwa was the primary factor in some districts, such as 
in Kuningan West Java and Lombok West Nusa Tenggara, enforcing 
new regional regulations on the prohibition or limitation of  Ahmadiyah 
activities in 2006.58 Due to these far-reaching effects and unintended 
consequences, some activists requested that the MUI consider revising 
or revoking this fatwa. 
While the consequences of  the fatwa were clearly visible in social 
conflict, some scholars, like Effendi, also questioned the legal authority 
of  the MUI to declare particular groups as deviant.59  Not only was the 
fatwa merely an ‘opinion’ from Muslim scholars and not legally binding 
for Muslims, but also the standing of  the MUI under Indonesian law 
was questioned by many liberal Muslim activists.60 The MUI was not a 
‘super body’ above the law with an autonomous right to excommunicate 
any particular religious group, given the fact that, as a social organization, 
this body is indeed in the same position as other organizations, including 
the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Community (JAI). 
Moreover, a critique from Mustofa Bisri, a leading NU kyai, of  
the references to three previous international resolutions (the IOC, the 
Majma al-Fiqh and the Majma al-Buhuts is also worth mentioning. For 
Bisri, quoting fatwas from these international Muslim organizations clearly 
indicated that the MUI’s fatwa was not very authentic and genuine for the 
domestic needs of  the local Indonesian Muslim community. According 
to him, this showed that the MUI lacked confidence and was more likely 
serving the interests of  international organizations rather than domestic 
57 Achmad Munjid, “Mencegat Kebebasan, Memaksa Keyakinan [Blocking the 
Freedom, Forcing the Belief],” Harian Tempo 17 January 2008.
58 Basyir Ahmad Suwarto, “Potret Minoritas Ahmadiyah Manislor yang Didis-
kriminasi [A Portrait of  Discriminated Ahmadi Minority in Manislor (KuninganWest 
Java)],” article available at http://wahidinstitute.org. Accessed on 17 may 2008. 
59 Djohan Effendi, “Solusi Masalah Ahmadiyah Indonesia [Solution for the 
Ahmadiyah Case in Indonesia],” Koran Tempo 12 January 2008;  
60 Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, “Masih Tentang Ahmadiyah [Still about the Ah-
madiyah],” article posted on 9 May 2008 available at http://islamlib.com/id/index.
php?page=article&id=1044. Accessed on 15 May 2008; and Luthfi Assyaukanie, “Fatwa 
dan Kekerasan,” article available at http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=1220, 
accessed on 16 May 2008.
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interests.61  
In addition to Bisri, Azyumardi Azra also argued that basing 
the fatwa on other fatwas from other Muslim countries or international 
organizations was a clear sign of  the MUI Board’s lack of  ‘social’ 
knowledge.  MUI should seek advice and discuss the issue with those 
who are very keen and knowledgeable about the local context before 
making a decision about the Ahmadiyah.62 Azra also pointed out that 
the MUI‘s  reference to the IOC’s fatwa was rather odd given the fact 
that Indonesia is not a member of  this Conference, and Indonesia is, 
therefore, not legally bound by any legal decisions of  this organization.
The MUI itself  on many occasions has clearly neglected the reality 
that its fatwa has been the source of  unrest and hostility towards the 
Ahmadiyah group. It has persisted in claiming the importance of  fatwa 
for guarding the faith of  the umma, serving as a clear guide in preventing 
more conversions of  traditional Muslims into the fold of  Ahmadiyah. 
For the MUI and supporters from various Muslim organizations, this 
fatwa concerned the internal affairs of  the Muslim community, warning 
groups from other religious traditions, who raised concerns, not to involve 
themselves in this debate.63 
The MUI’s firm stand on the issue was supported by numerous 
Muslim organizations and Islamic political parties. Support for it was 
also expressed in many forms, including online opinions and printed 
literature. Whether for the sake of  religious zeal or commercial motives, 
many books and popular opinions were published in newspapers, 
61 Mustofa Bisri, “Fatwa MUI Refleksi Ketidakpercayaan Diri [MUI Fatwa is 
Mirror of  a Lack of  Confident]” in Ahmad Sueadi (ed.), Kala Fatwa Menjadi Penjara [When 
Fatwa Becomes Prison] (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), p. 254-255; and his article, 
“Yang Sesat dan Yang Ngamuk [The Deviant and the Amok],” Jawa Post 23 April 2008 
available at http://jawapos.com/ index.php?act=detail_c&id=337871, accesed on 14 May 
2008.
62 See Azyumardi Azra’s comment available at http://www.tempointeraktif.com/
hg/ nasional/2005/08/02/brk,20050802-64678,id.html.
63 See for example the statement from Forum Masyarakat Peduli “FOMPI Siap 
Bela Fatwa MUI [FOMPI is Ready to Defent the MUI Fatwa], Harian Bangsa 4 August 
2005 as quoted by John Olle, “The Campaign Against ‘Heresy’: State and Society in 
Negotiation in Indonesia,” paper presented to the 16th Biennial Conference of  the 
Asian Studies Association of  Australis in Wollonggong 26-29 June 2006, p. 3. 
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magazines and journals, describing the fallacies and inconsistencies of  the 
Ahmadiyah teachings for the Muslim public.64  Massive demonstrations 
and submission of  petitions from these organizations and Muslim 
politicians to the government, created pressure for a more severe policy 
towards the Ahmadiyah, steering Indonesian Islamic discourse in 2006 
and 2007.
The current government, in mid-2005, through the Coordinating 
Body of  Monitoring and Supervision of  Religious Sects (Bakor Pakem/
Badan Koordinasi Pengawasan dan Perkembangan Aliran Kepercayaan), 
under the office of  the State Attorney (Kejaksaan Agung), indeed tried 
to settle this contentious debate by ‘recommending’ the prohibition of  
all organizations, activities, teachings and books of  the Ahmadiyah in 
Indonesia.65  With this intention in mind, the Ministry of  Religious Affairs 
then initiated seven dialogues with the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonedia 
(JAI) “with the expectation to find the solution for the matter [of  the 
Ahmadiyah]” accordingly.  
There were seven ‘options’ offered to the JAI in the dialogues. Some 
of  these options were unarguably very contentious from the beginning. 
The results of  the ‘dialogues’ were apparent at the end, offering either the 
dissolution of  the JAI by the government or by the court. Other softer 
options were that the Ahmadi members would be ‘expelled’ from the 
64 See for examples new books on the Ahmadiyah like M. Amin Djamaludin, 
Ahmadiyah dan Pembajakan Al-Quran [Ahmadiyah and Quran Plagiarism]; (Jakarta: 
2002); Ahmadiyah Menodai Islam: Kumpulan Fakta dan Data [The Ahmadiyah Violates 
Islam: Collection of  Facts and Data] (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam 
[LPPI], 2004; Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Aliran and Paham Sesat di Indonesia [Deviants Sects 
and Doctines in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2002); Ahmad Lutfi Fathul-
lah, Menguak Kesesatan Aliran Ahmadiyah [Uncovering the Deviance of  the Ahmadiyah 
Sect] (Jakarta: Pustaka Array, 2004); and M. Yuanda Zara, Aliran-aliran Sesat di Indonesia 
[Deviants Sects in Indonesia] (Yogyakarta: Banyu Media, 2007); or numerous article 
like H.M. Amin Jamaluddin, “Menjawab Kebohongan Ahmadiyah,” article posted on 
16 January 2008 available at http://salafy.wordpress.com/2008/01/16/menjawab-
kebohongan-ahmadiyah. Accessed on 15 May 2008.
65 “Penjelasan Kepala Badan Litbang dan Diklat Departemen Agama tentang 
Perkembangan dan Penanganan Masalah Ahmadiyah di Indonesia [Statement of  
Chairperson of  Research and Development Body Ministry of  Religious Affairs on the 
Ahmadiyah in Indonesia,” p. 1-2, available also at http://www.depag.web.id/doc/get/10, 
accessed on 20 May 2008. 
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Muslim community and then categorized as non-Muslims, as in Pakistan, 
or that the group would be regarded as a sect within the Indonesian 
Muslim community, abiding by ‘some indispensible conditions’.66 There 
was no surprise at all that JAI would choose the last option. 
This last option had an immediate consequence as it required the 
group to provide a clear account of  their religious beliefs and view of  
societal life, in order to gain ‘recognition’ and ‘acceptance’ as part of  the 
Indonesian Muslim community.  It was then on 14 January 2008, that 
the JAI released the Twelve Points of  Statement from the JAI (12 Butir 
Penjelasan JAI) to the public, stating that:
(1) We the Indonesian Ahmadiyah community from its beginning believe 
in and affirmed Islamic confession statements (kalimat shahadat) as taught 
by the Prophet Muhammad that there is no God but Allah and that 
Muhammad is truly the messenger of  God; (2) For its beginning, we 
the Indonesian Ahmadiyah community believe that Muhammad is the 
last prophet; (3) Amongst our belief  is that Mizra Ghulam Ahmad is 
the teacher, the religious adviser (mursyid), the bearer of  good news and 
warning, and the holder of  good promises (mubasyirat), the founder and 
leader of  the Ahmadiyah community whose role is to strengthen Islamic 
mission that previously carried by the Prophet Muhammad; (4) We intact 
the word Muhammad with the word Rasulullah emphasizing that it was 
the Prophet of  Muhammad in the ten [Ahmadiiyah] Bai’ats requested 
for and read by the new Ahmadi; (5) We the Indonesian Ahmadiyah 
community believe that [a] there is no revelation with shari>’ah after the 
Qur’an which sent down to the Prophet of  Muhammad; [b] The Qur’an 
and the prophetic tradition are our teaching sources we follow; (6) The 
book of  Tadzikah is not the holy book for the Ahmadis, but the spiritual 
document of  Mirza Ghulam Ahmad collected, bound and named by his 
follower in 1935, twenty seven years after his death in 1908; (7) We the 
Indonesian Ahmadiyah community have not and never regarded those 
outside the Ahmadiyah as the infidels in word and in action; (8) We the 
Indonesian Ahmadiyah community have not and never regarded any 
mosque we built as the Ahmadiyah Mosque; (9) We state that every 
66 Penjelasan Kepala Badan Litbang,” p. 2. The dialogues were held on 7 Sep-
tember 2007, 2 October 2007, 8 November 2007, 29 November 2007, 6 December 
2007, 19 December 2007 and 24 January 2008. All dialogues were in the Office of  
Badan Litbang in Jakarta, expect one (19 December 2007) was in the Central Police 
Office (Mabes Polri).
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mosque built and managed by the Ahmadiyah community is open for all 
Muslims from any group; (10) We the Indonesian Ahmadiyah community 
as the Muslims always register any marriage to the office of  religious affair 
(KUA-Kantor Urusan Agama) and consult any divorce case and other 
cases with the Religious Court in accord with the existing law system; (11) 
We the Indonesian Ahmadiyah community will participate to strengthen 
social interaction and work together with any other Muslim group and 
community in the social service for the progress of  Islam, nation and 
the unity of  the republic (NKRI-Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia); 
and (12) through this statement, we the executive body of  the Indonesian 
Ahmadiyah community expect the Ahmadiyah community and Muslim 
community as well as Indonesian community to understand under the 
sprit of  Islamic brotherhood, and for the sake of  national unity.”67
There is no doubt that the publication of  the 12 Butir Penjelasan 
JAI opened the way for the government to take further action against the 
Ahmadiyah if  the group failed to fulfill the conditions in the Penjelasan 
within three months.  Along with the socialization of  this Penjelasan 
though out the country, MORA, on 24 Januari 2008, formed a special 
team to investigate and monitor the implementation of  the Penjelasan 
in practice. This body consisted of  members representing four offices 
of  MORA, the Ministry of  Internal Affairs, the State Attorney and the 
Indonesian Police. 
It should surprise no one that this team would find discrepancies 
between Ahmadiyah teachings and that of  traditional Muslims. Within 
three weeks, the team found evidence of  this. On 18 February 2008, the 
team sent a letter to the JAI requesting a more clear statement on the issue 
of  Muhammad as the last prophet and the position of  Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad in Ahmadiyah teaching, as they found that some books published 
by the JAI were not in accord with the JAI’s Penjelasan, in particular Point 
2 and 3.68  As the JAI was unable to give satisfactory answers to these 
inquiries, the team came to the conclusion that the JAI had intentionally 
broken the ‘covenant’. It recommended the Bakor Pakem take further 
action, arguing that the group had failed to fulfill all the points in the 
67 Pengurus Besar Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, “12 Butir Penjelasan Jemaat 
Ahmadiyah Indonesia,” available at http://www.ahmadiyya.or.id/index.php?option=com, 
accessed on 14 May 2008.
68 Penjelasan Kepala Badan Litbang,” p. 11. 
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Penjelasan. On 16 April 2008, the Bakor Pakem gave a clear signal that the 
government would issue a new decision on Ahmadiyah,69 unsurprisingly 
triggering a new heated controversy and causing groups to line up, either 
‘for’ or ‘against’ the government’s initiative.
From the beginning, the involvement of  the government in the 
Ahmadiyah case in Indonesia raised severe responses and arduous critics 
from moderate Muslims and human rights activists. Some saw that the 
government’s interest in managing religious activities would violate the 
basic freedom of  citizens to believe in a particular religion and doctrine, 
as explicitly guaranteed by the Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945). It 
also contravened existing laws in Indonesia, such as Article 22 of  the Law 
no. 39 Year 1999 on Human Rights as well as international agreements 
like the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
which the Indonesian government ratified.70  
Many regretted the involvement of  the government in theological 
debates and its use of  theological reasons for prohibiting the Ahmadiyah 
when in fact the Indonesian political system is ‘secular’. Under the existing 
law, only if  the group violated the order and created social unrest, could 
the government take action, but unfortunately, it was not the case for 
the Ahmadiyah group.
However, the proponents for further government action towards 
the Ahmadiyah included prominent Muslim political parties like Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) 
as well as many Muslim organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah. Many demonstrations were held and numerous petitions 
by many Muslim organizations were sent to the President to hasten the 
69 See official notes on “Rakor Pakem [Coordinating Pakem Meeting],” in Aula 
Jaksa Agung Muda Intelijen Jakarta 16 April 2008, private circulation. 
70 See for examples Novriantoni, “Melarang Ahmadiyah: Apa Kata Dunia? 
[Banning the Ahmadiyah: What the World would Say?],” article posted on 22 January 
2008 available at http://islamlib.com/id/index.php?page=article&id=1319, accessed on 15 
May 2008; also Masykurudin Hafidz, “Mohon Maaf, Ahmadiyah [Sorry, Ahmadiyah],” 
Koran Tempo 22 April 2008; and Ismatu Ropi, “Kebebasan Agama dan Peraturan yang 
Bertabrakan [Religious Freedom and the Contradicting Regulations],” Media Indonesia 
16 May 2008.
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issuance of  the decree prohibiting Ahmadiyah in the country.71
At this point, altering its previously firm position, the government 
was evidently reluctant to take any considerable steps against the 
Ahmadiyah after having discerned the legal and political situation for 
them under existing Indonesian law, at the urging of  moderate Muslims 
and human rights activists. However, political legitimacy before the 
Muslim majority was also undoubtedly essential for the government.  It 
took some months to review the case, until finally a new regulation in the 
form of  Surat Keputusan Bersama/SKB (the Joints Ministerial Decree) 
was signed by the Minister of  Religious Affairs, the State Attorney and 
the Minister of  Internal Affairs on 9 June 2008.72 
The SKB was very subtle and appeared to be quite comprehensive. 
Referring to seventeen existing regulations in Indonesia, this SKB 
recommended six important points that:
“[First] to give warning and to order all society not to inform, to persuade 
or to mobilize any attempt for interpreting any religion embraced in 
Indonesia or for doing any activities resembling religious activities which 
are deviant to that of  foundation of  religious doctrines; [Second] to 
give warning and to order followers, members, and/or members of  the 
executive body of  the JAI along with their confession as Muslims, to 
stop the spreading any interpretation and activities which are deviant 
to the foundation of  Islamic doctrines such as spreading the belief  on 
the existence of  new prophet with new teaching after the Prophet of  
Muhammad; [Third] the followers, members, and/or members of  the 
71 “Surat Terbuka Forum Umat Islam Kepada Presiden RI untuk Pembubaran 
Ahmadiyah”, available at http://forum.syabab.com/index.php; accessed on 15 May 
2008; “Surat Terbuka Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) kepada Presiden tentang Pemn-
bubaran Ahmadiyah”, available at http://musliminsuffer.wordpress.com. Accessed on 
15 May 2008; “Pandangan Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia terhadap Ahmadiyah”, 
available at http://hidayatullah.com/index.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=6192&
Itemid=65, accessed on 15 May 2008.
72 As recorded that this regulation was issued only a week after the incident of  
Monas on 1 June 2008. In this incident, some human rights activists, who held a peace 
demonstration in support for religious freedom in Indonesia, was belligerently attacked 
by radical Muslim wing, the Forum Pembela Islam (FPI or Islamic Defender Forum). Some 
of  those activists were badly injured, and the echo of  this attack was far reaching and 
widely covered in national and international media. Some concerned that the effect of  
this incident would create a new horizontal conflict within the society.
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executive body of  the JAI who ignore the warning and order as mentioned 
in Point 1 and 2 would be sanctioned in accord with the existing 
regulation, including to its organization and other legal bodies; [Fourth] 
to give warning and to order the community to preserve and maintain 
religious harmony and rest and order in societal life by not committing 
any activity and/or action against the law toward the followers, members, 
and/or members of  executive body of  the JAI; [Fifth] those members of  
community who ignore the warning and order as mentioned in Point 1 
and 2 would be sanctioned in accord with existing regulation; [Sixth] to 
order the central and local government apparatus to take any measured 
steps in order to maintain and monitor this Joint Decree.” 73
One easily saw that this new regulation, issued after the incident, 
unsurprisingly ignited heated debates.74 While this government action was 
supported by many Muslim organizations, this SKB was noticeably vague 
in its nature as well as ambiguous in its content. Hence, it seemed the 
SKB was not well-prepared, serving an ad hoc interest and not designed 
for the fair management of  religious affairs in the country. There were 
some inherent weaknesses in the SKB itself  regarding its implementation. 
First, this SKB quoted verbatim Indonesian Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 
as manifested in Point 1 and 2.  For many scholars and activists, this Law 
was a nightmare due to its hegemonic and authoritarian nature, giving 
ultimate power to the regime for managing religious affairs in Indonesia. 
It was very apparent in the New Order era that this Indonesian blasphemy 
law was undoubtedly an effective tool for taking severe action against 
many alleged deviant sects in Indonesia. Records show that the regime 
vigorously prohibited more than 50 religious cases, based on doctrines 
73 “Keputusan Bersama Menteri Agama, Jaksa Agung, dan Menteri Dalam 
Negeri Republik Indonesia No. 3 Tahun 2008; No. KEP-033/A/JA/6/2008; No. 
199 Tahun 2008 tentang Peringatan dan Perintah kepada Penganut, Anggota, dan/
atau Anggota Pengurus Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) dan Warga Masyarakat 
[Joint Decree of  Minister of  Religious Affairs, the State Attorney, and the Minsiter of  
Internal Affairs on Warning and Order to the Followers, Member, and/or Members 
of  Executive Body of  Indonesian Ahmadiyah Community (JAI) and General Social 
Community,” availabe at http//www.depag.or.id, accesed on 11 June 2008. 
74 See Ahmad Suaedy, “Ahmadiyah dan Pemerintahan yang Panik [Ahmadiyah 
and the Panic Government], Koran Tempo 12 June 2008
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and teachings, using this law.75  Although this law has not been revoked, 
for many activists and legal scholars, its legal substance was outdated given 
the enactment of  Law No. 39/1995 on Human Rights and of  the new 
Law No. 12/2005 on the Ratification of  the ICCPR. It also, moreover, 
contradicted the spirit of  the new amended Constitution (UUD 1945) 
which clearly guaranteed religious freedom for all citizens.76 Hence, the 
verbatim use of  this Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 as the main legal source 
strongly indicated that the government lacked any reasonable and 
contextual argument for the prohibition of  the Ahmadiyah.
Second, some saw that the subject of  the warning and order in this 
SKB seemed very strange and dubious. It was unclear whether it would 
be exclusively directed to Ahmadiyah group or was also applicable to the 
community and the government apparatus in general. Of  six points in the 
SKB, only two points were apparently related to the Ahmadiyah group, 
while the remaining points were very broad in nature as general warnings 
and orders for the community or general orders for the government 
officers themselves.
Third, the content of  the SKB, in particular Point 2 prohibiting 
any activities of  the Ahmadiyah group which were deviant according to 
Islamic doctrines, was also ambiguous and controversial. Many activists 
inquired further as to what kind of  activities were to be regarded 
as deviant in accordance with traditional Islamic teachings. If  those 
Ahmadis, for example, performed prayers exactly as traditional Muslims 
prayed, should the government consider this as deviant activity and then 
take action to stop the prayers. 
Fourth, and more importantly, the new Tata Tertib Perundangan as 
stated in Article 7 of  Law No. 10/2004 on Making Law clearly pointed 
out that the SKB did not have much importance in the hierarchy of  
laws under the new Indonesian legal system. In this context, the SKB 
is loosely binding on parties and, therefore, inadequate for serving as a 
75 Departemen Agama RI, Peraturan Perundang-udangan Kehidupan Beragama 
[Regulations on Religious Life] (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 1998).
76 See for example Rumadi, “SKB Setengah Hati [A Half-Hearted Joint De-
cree],” Kompas 11 June 2008.
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legal norm for any sanctioned action towards the group.77 It would be 
impossible that these three Ministerial bureaucracies were not aware of  
this new formation of  Indonesian law. Hence, some speculated that the 
government was intentionally using the form of  the SKB to make this 
new regulation of  the Ahmadiyah defective from the beginning and 
therefore inapplicable.
However, whatever its legal deficiencies, many activists went 
further, raising concerns that this policy in practice would justify more 
social conflict at the grass roots level and be used as a legal argument, in 
coordination with the religious argument from the MUI’s fatwa. 
It, nevertheless, seemed clear that the issuance of  the SKB on 
the Ahmadiyah indicated the inability of  the government to preserve its 
neutral position in managing religious affairs in Indonesia. Clearly, the 
government seemed handicapped by the steady pressure from Muslim 
groups wanting to apply their standardized values in the archipelago. For 
many, this was an apt example of  an inappropriate political concession 
by a weak state to a strong civil society.  
However, the legal battle ultimately found the government to 
be, surprisingly, the real winner and not the Muslim majority. Like the 
previous regulation of  the Ahmadiyah in the mid of  1980s, this new 
decree was not designed to be easily implemented as this SKB was from 
the beginning proven to be legally defective as a legal basis. This new 
regulation was issued for the sake of  improving the reputation of  the 
regime and ensuring its political survival vis-a-vis the steady Muslim 
majority’s demands. In this sense, through the issuance of  this policy, 
not only had the government received political credit, but at the same 
time, like in the 1980s, it successfully gained support and warm applause 
from Muslim conservative groups who considered the regime to have 
given in to their persistent demands to block Ahmadiyah teaching and 
activity in Indonesia.
Even if  the President of  the Republic Indonesia as requested in the 
Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 would issue a ‘real’ decree to ban the Ahmadiyah 
group in Indonesia, a new problem would immediately arise regarding 
the management of  the group’s assets. According to Indonesian law, if  
77 See for example Ismatu Ropi, “SKB yang Cacat Hukum [the Defected Joint 
Decree],” Koran Jakarta 13 June 2008. 
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an organization is outlawed and banned by the government, the assets 
owned by that group would be overseen by the government. In this sense, 
given the pressure from civil society on the weak state, one may imagine 
that ownership of  the assets of  the banned group would be the new 
battleground. Each of  them would claim itself  as the most appropriate 
body to manage the assets and undoubtedly this would be a new source 
for more tension, social conflicts and apparent prejudice.
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